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Abstract
We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state
and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggre-
gate information. We analyze truthtelling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communi-
cation in heterogeneous committees and ﬁnd that full pooling of information followed by
sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conﬂict in the committee.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a deliberation and voting model in which rich state and signal spaces
combine with a binary action space. A committee consisting of privately informed agents
with known heterogeneous preferences engages in simultaneous information exchange prior
to voting. Our information structure generates a concern for consistency in the aggregation
of individual signals; a given signal is interpreted diﬀerently depending on how it matches
other available evidence. We ﬁnd that in contrast to the classical model featuring binary state
and signal spaces, full information sharing and sincere voting can constitute an equilibrium
although agents with some probability disagree ex post.
Consider the example of a jury aiming at determining whether a defendant is guilty or
innocent. If guilty, he must have committed the crime at one speciﬁc point in time, for
example on one particular day of a given week. If innocent, he must have been engaged in
some activity at the moment of the crime; for example working, watching TV, or doing sports.
Diﬀerent days of the week constitute mutually exclusive variants of the guilty state while
diﬀerent activities constitute mutually exclusive variants of the innocent state.
Jurors gather evidence through a trial hearing which generates private signals. Before
deciding whether to acquit or convict, jurors retire to deliberate and share their private signals.
Consider two possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, half of the jurors received a signal
indicating that the defendant committed the crime on Monday, while the other half received a
signal indicating that he committed the crime on Wednesday. In the second scenario, all jurors
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received a signal indicating Monday. The latter scenario is more consistent than the ﬁrst and
therefore provides more convincing evidence of guilt. Jurors do not as such care about the
time at which the crime was committed but wish to establish with suﬃcient certainty whether
the defendant is guilty or innocent. More consistent proﬁles yield stronger evidence.
The core elements of the above description apply to many other situations. Consider a
group of investment bankers that contemplates investing in shares of a large manufacturer,
e.g. Chrysler. Committee members need to assess whether Chrysler will avoid bankruptcy in
the near future. This may happen if either the US Federal State provides a bailout package
or if some private company (e.g. Fiat) decides to step in. On the other hand, if Chrysler
does go bankrupt, this may happen according to diﬀerent chapters of the bankruptcy code.
Another example is that of a board of directors that seeks to predict whether a Democrat or
a Republican will win the next US presidential election. Diﬀerent Democratic (Republican)
candidates constitute diﬀerent variants of the Democratic (Republican) state.
We incorporate the key features of the above examples into a model of collective decision
making. There are two basic states, each of which splits into a set of substates. Each signal
is informative with respect to a basic state and a particular substate. In this context, the
consistency of signals matters as illustrated above; more consistent signals provide stronger
evidence for the corresponding state. Members of a heterogeneous committee communicate via
cheap talk before voting on a binary outcome. In contrast to results obtained in the classical
binary signal setup,1 we ﬁnd that the truthful communication and sincere voting equilibrium
(TS equilibrium) is virtually always compatible with a positive probability of ex post conﬂict
among agents.
The intuition for our result comes out clearly when compared to the classical binary signal
model.2 In the latter, in the putative TS equilibrium, pivotality at the communication stage
pins down uniquely the information held by the remaining committee members. Disagreement
about the optimal decision rule implies that there is always at least one agent for whom this
pivotal proﬁle implies a suboptimal decision on the equilibrium path. Consequently, this agent
proﬁtably deviates and bends the decision rule in his favored direction.
In our model, the set of pivotal proﬁles is not a singleton anymore: diﬀerent signal proﬁles
can yield similar posteriors because the conditional probability of guilt depends on two aspects,
the total number of signals indicating respectively guilt or innocence as well as the consistency
of signals within these subsets. A smaller total number of guilty signals can be compensated
by a higher degree of consistency among guilty signals. The multiplicity of pivotal scenarios in
our model allows two eﬀects to come into play. First, there exist pivotal proﬁles for which all
agents agree with the decision taken on the equilibrium path. At these proﬁles a deviation is
disadvantageous (consensus eﬀect). Second, the impact of an agent's announcement depends
on the signals of the whole committee. He faces uncertainty as to which announcement is
more or less consistent with other agents' signals and is thus suitable to shift the outcome in
a desired direction (uncertainty eﬀect).
Building on the theory of strategic voting as information aggregation (E.g. Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Bhattacharya (2013)), diﬀerent classes
of contributions have analyzed communication in heterogeneous committees by modifying the
baseline model (Coughlan (2000)). Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), Meirowitz (2007), and
1See Coughlan (2000), Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), Meirowitz (2007), Van Weelden (2008).
2See in particular Coughlan (2000).
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Le Quement (2013) examine the implications of preference uncertainty. Van Weelden (2008),
Hummel (2012), and Le Quement and Yokeeswaran (2015) analyze alternative communication
protocols. Gerardi et al. (2009), Gerardi and Yariv (2007), and Wolinsky (2002) adopt a
mechanism design approach. Additionally, experimental work has analyzed communication
behavior in groups (E.g. Goeree and Yariv (2011) and Dickson et al. (2008)). Our contribution
lies in the introduction of a novel information structure that captures the idea that individual
information is interpreted within the context of aggregate information.
2 The model
A jury of n agents, n ∈ N, n ≥ 3 has to decide whether to acquit (A) or convict (C) a defendant.
The defendant is either innocent (I) or guilty (G). Both innocence and guilt occur in ﬁnitely
many diﬀerent variants i1, ..., imI and g1, ..., gmG , respectively, withmI ,mG ∈ N, mI ,mG ≥ 2.3
The state space is hence given as Ω = I ∪G where I = {i1, ..., imI} and G = {g1, ..., gmG}. We
denote the state by ω and say that the defendant is innocent if ω ∈ I and guilty if ω ∈ G. The
state is drawn from a publicly known prior distribution such that P (ω ∈ I) + P (ω ∈ G) = 1,
P (il) =
P (ω∈I)
mI
∀l ∈ {1, ...,mI}, and P (gl) = P (ω∈G)mG ∀l ∈ {1, ...,mG}.
The jury implements an action a ∈ {A,C} by voting according to a voting rule k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} casts a vote in favor of one of the two actions. If the
number of votes cast for conviction is greater than or equal to k, the defendant is convicted
while otherwise he is acquitted.
The utility of agent j from action a conditional on ω ∈ Ω is given by
uj (a, ω) =

0 if (a, ω) ∈ {(A, I) (C,G)}
−qj if (a, ω) = (C, I)
− (1− qj) if (a, ω) = (A,G).
The commonly known preference parameter qj ∈ (0, 1) characterizes the relative importance
assigned to the two types of errors.4 As agent j maximizes expected utility, he prefers con-
viction over acquittal if and only if the probability of the defendant being guilty exceeds the
cut-oﬀ qj . We mainly focus on the case of a committee featuring two preference types qH < qD
referred to as hawks and doves.
Prior to the voting stage, each agent receives a private signal s ∈ S = Ω. Signals are i.i.d.
across agents conditional on ω: If ω = il for some l ∈ {1, ...,mI}, then
P (s = il|ω = il) = λ · p
λ+ (mI − 1) ,
P (s = ir|ω = il) = p
λ+ (mI − 1) ∀r ∈ {1, ...,mI} , r 6= l,
P (s = gr|ω = il) = 1− p
mG
∀r ∈ {1, ...,mG} ,
3The case of mI = mG = 1 corresponds to the classical model analyzed in Coughlan (2000) and others.
4Existing results (Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006)) indicate that truthful communication is easier to
achieve if there is uncertainty about preference types. By assuming observable preference types, we isolate the
speciﬁc truthtelling incentives that are inherent to our model.
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with p ∈ (12 , 1) and λ > 1. If ω = gl for some l ∈ {1, ...,mG}, respective expressions apply
after permuting i and g as well as I and G.5 Applying Bayes' law, p measures up to priors
the probability that the signal correctly reveals whether the defendant is innocent or guilty.
λ = P (s=il|ω=il)P (s=il|ω=ir) =
P (s=gl|ω=gl)
P (s=gl|ω=gr) measures the relative informativeness of signals with respect
to the particular variant of innocence or guilt. We ﬁnally assume that
P (s = il|ω = ir)
P (s = il|ω = gt) ≥1 ∀l, r ∈ {1, ...,mI} , t ∈ {1, ...,mG} and
P (s = gl|ω = gr)
P (s = gl|ω = it) ≥1 ∀l, r ∈ {1, ...,mG} , t ∈ {1, ...,mI} ,
which is equivalent to requiring a lower bound p ≥ max
{
mG−1+λ
2mG−1+λ ,
mI−1+λ
2mI−1+λ
}
on the informa-
tiveness of signals with respect to innocence and guilt.
A collection of signals constitutes a signal proﬁle σ = (x1, ..., xmI , y1, ..., ymG) where xr
denotes the number of ir-signals, r ∈ {1, ...,mI} and yl denotes the number of gl-signals,
l ∈ {1, ...,mG}. Conditional on signal proﬁle σ, the posterior probability of guilt is given by
β (σ) ≡ P (ω ∈ G|σ) = P (ω ∈ G) · P (σ|ω ∈ G)
P (ω ∈ G) · P (σ|ω ∈ G) + P (ω ∈ I) · P (σ|ω ∈ I) .
In terms of utilities agents only care whether ω ∈ I or ω ∈ G, hence the number β (σ) is a
suﬃcient statistic for the preferred action of each individual agent for any signal proﬁle σ.
The timing of the game is as follows: Nature draws ω from f . Each agent receives a private
signal s. Subsequently, agents simultaneously send a public cheap talk message m ∈M = S.6
Finally, each agent casts a vote, the action a ∈ {A,C} is implemented according to the voting
rule, and payoﬀs are realized.
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We focus on the so-called TS
equilibrium: agents truthfully reveal their private information by sending a message m = s at
the communication stage and (correctly) believe that others communicate truthfully as well.
Subsequently, agents vote sincerely by voting for conviction if and only if β(σ) ≥ qj .
3 A simple example
Consider a three persons committee consisting of two doves and one hawk. The voting rule
is k = 2, i.e. simple majority. Let I = {i1, i2} and G = {g1, g2}. Referring to the example
given in the introduction, think of i1 as innocent and working, i2 as innocent and doing
sports, g1 as guilty on Monday, and g2 as guilty on Wednesday. Aggregate signal proﬁles
are ordered as follows
β (3, 0, 0, 0)
β (0, 3, 0, 0)
< . . . <
β (1, 0, 0, 2) , β (1, 0, 2, 0)
β (0, 1, 0, 2) , β (0, 1, 2, 0)
<
β (0, 0, 1, 2)
β (0, 0, 2, 1)
<
β (0, 0, 0, 3)
β (0, 0, 3, 0)
.
Suppose qH , qD are such that a dove favors conviction if and only if the aggregate signal proﬁle
is either (0, 0, 0, 3) or (0, 0, 3, 0) while a hawk in addition favors conviction for proﬁles (0, 0, 1, 2)
5Note that whenever λ > 1 our signal generating process is not reducible to a process that generates
i.i.d. signals conditional on I and G. It is, however, reducible to a process that generates correlated signals
conditional on I and G.
6See end of Section 3 for a comment on sequential communication.
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and (0, 0, 2, 1), so that the group disagrees for these two proﬁles. While both groups require
three g-signals to prefer conviction, doves furthermore require these g-signals to be consistent.
In this setting the TS equilibrium exists, as we now show.
An agent never has an incentive to deviate from sincere voting as this weakly decreases the
probability that his favored decision ensues. This holds true independently of his announce-
ment at the communication stage. Moreover, given that the voting rule is simple majority
doves can always enforce their favored decision and thus have no incentive to deviate from
truthtelling.
We now analyze the truthtelling incentives of the hawk. The hawk's announcement is piv-
otal if the remaining two agents hold signal proﬁles (0, 0, 2, 0) or (0, 0, 0, 2). In the ﬁrst (second)
case, a g1- (g2-) announcement triggers conviction while any of the remaining announcements
causes acquittal. Given the symmetry of the model, conditions ensuring truthtelling when
the hawk holds an i1- or an i2-signal are identical modulo an exchange of subscripts. We can
therefore without loss focus on deviation incentives conditional on an i1-signal. An equivalent
argument applies when the hawk holds a g1- or a g2-signal.
Let the hawk hold an i1-signal and be pivotal at the communication stage. The aggregate
signal proﬁle is then (1, 0, 2, 0) or (1, 0, 0, 2). In either case, the committee decision given the
true signal proﬁle is acquittal and coincides with the decision favored by the hawk. Accordingly,
he has no incentive to deviate from truthtelling. Here, the consensus eﬀect is the source of
truthtelling: a hawk holding an i1-signal fully agrees with the doves on the preferred action
in all pivotal scenarios.
Assume next that the hawk holds a g1-signal and is pivotal in the communication stage.
The signal proﬁle of the entire committee is then either (0, 0, 1, 2) or (0, 0, 3, 0). The hawk
disagrees with the acquittal ensuing from truthtelling at (0, 0, 1, 2) while he agrees with the
conviction ensuing from truthtelling at (0, 0, 3, 0). If the hawk deviates to announcing some
i-signal, the signal proﬁle observed by others at the voting stage is either (1, 0, 2, 0), (1, 0, 0, 2),
(0, 1, 0, 2) or (0, 1, 2, 0), in all cases leading to an undesired acquittal. If the hawk deviates to
a g2-announcement, the signal proﬁle observed by the remaining agents at the voting stage is
(0, 0, 0, 3) or (0, 0, 2, 1). The deviation beneﬁcially overturns an acquittal in the ﬁrst case but
adversely overturns a conviction in the second case. The hawk thus faces uncertainty about
the impact of his statement. Among the two pivotal proﬁles, (0, 0, 0, 2) incentivizes lying
while (0, 0, 2, 0) incentivizes truthtelling. We call this the uncertainty eﬀect. Which incentive
dominates depends on the relative likelihood assigned to these two proﬁles, the latter itself
depending on the probability assigned to the states g1 and g2. An agent holding a g1-signal
assigns a higher probability to state g1 than to state g2 and accordingly to proﬁle (0, 0, 2, 0)
than to proﬁle (0, 0, 0, 2). The signal proﬁle that incentivizes truthtelling is thus considered
more likely than the one that incentivizes lying. Hence the hawk never prefers to announce a
g2-signal. We conclude that the TS equilibrium exists despite the existence of signal proﬁles
generating ex post conﬂict.
We close with two remarks. By the same arguments as above, the TS equilibrium also
exists under unanimity when k = 3. Moreover, the TS equilibrium continues to exist under
sequential communication if the hawk speaks ﬁrst. Indeed, the hawk's incentives then replicate
those arising under simultaneous communication while doves still determine the outcome and
hence have no incentives to deviate.7
7The existence of the TS equilibrium under unanimity and sequential communication stands in contrast to
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4 Analysis of the TS equilibrium
The example of Section 3 shows that the TS equilibrium can exist despite potential disagree-
ment after full pooling of information. In what follows, we provide an equilibrium analysis for
the general model.
For any signal s ∈ S, let σs denote the signal proﬁle that consists of one signal s only.
Moreover, for a given agent j, we denote the signal proﬁle of all other agents by σ−j . The
following lemma addresses the eﬀect of shifting mass from one entry of σ to another. This
replicates the change in beliefs of other agents achievable by misreporting a signal in the
putative TS equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For any signal proﬁle σ = (x1, ..., xmI , y1, ..., ymG), the function β (σ) is invariant
under any permutation of x-entries and any permutation of y-entries of σ. Moreover, the
following inequalities hold:
β (σ + σgr) > β (σ + σil) ∀l ∈ {1, ...,mI} , r ∈ {1, ...,mG} , (4.1)
β (σ + σgl) ≥ β (σ + σgr) ∀l, r ∈ {1, ...,mI} , yr ≤ yl, (4.2)
β (σ + σil) ≤ β (σ + σir) ∀l, r ∈ {1, ...,mI} , xr ≤ xl. (4.3)
Conditions (4.2) and (4.3) hold with equality if and only if respectively yl = yr or xl = xr.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that three factors determine the posterior probability of guilt; an increase
in the total number of g-signals and in the consistency of the proﬁle of g-signals leads to an
increase in the posterior probability of guilt. An increase in the consistency of the proﬁle of
i-signals has the opposite eﬀect.
Note that if λ = 1 or mG = mI = 1 the impossibility result shown in Coughlan (2000)
applies: the TS equilibrium exists if and only if either 1) at least k agents (n−k agents) favor
conviction (acquittal) for any realization of signals or 2) all agents favor the same action for
any realization of signals. The existence of the TS equilibrium beyond these trivial cases thus
requires both an enlarged state and signal space as well as the assumption that signals are
informative with respect to the variant of innocence or guilt that applies.
Introducing terminology, we say that hawks have critical mass if the number of hawks is
weakly greater than k, so that hawks are suﬃciently many to impose conviction whenever
they wish. Otherwise, doves have critical mass. We call a signal proﬁle σ a conﬂict proﬁle if
conditional on σ hawks and doves disagree on the preferred action, that is, if qH < β (σ) < qD.
We impose the following simple assumption on preferences of hawks and doves.
Assumption 1 (No partisans). The preferred action of each agent depends on the aggregate
signal proﬁle. Moreover, hawks require less than the maximal possible evidence of guilt to prefer
conviction and doves require less than the maximal possible evidence of innocence to prefer
acquittal.
the impossibility results of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) and Van Weelden (2008).
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Let q denote the threshold of the group that has critical mass and consider an agent j from
the group that does not have critical mass. We denote the set of signal proﬁles σ−j at which
an ir-report by agent j triggers an acquittal while a gl-report triggers a conviction by
Pivir,gl (q) ≡ {σ−j : β (σ−j + σir) < q ∧ β (σ−j + σgl) ≥ q} .
Our main result reads as follows.
Theorem 1. Let k be non-unanimous and impose Assumption 1.
a) Assume hawks have critical mass. The TS equilibrium exists if and only if
qD ≤ qˆD (qH) ≡ 1
P (σ−j ∈ Pivir,gl (qH) |sj = gl)
∑
σ−j∈Pivir,gl (qH )
P (σ−j |sj = gl) · β (σ−j + σgl) .
b) Assume doves have critical mass. The TS equilibrium exists if and only if
qH ≥ qˆH (qD) ≡ 1
P (σ−j ∈ Pivir,gl (qD) |sj = ir)
∑
σ−j∈Pivir,gl (qD)
P (σ−j |sj = ir) · β (σ−j + σir ) .
c) If hawks have critical mass and qD = qˆD(qH) there exists at least one conﬂict proﬁle.
If doves have critical mass and qH = qˆH (qD) there exists at least one conﬂict proﬁle.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 provides a general existence result for the TS equilibrium. Part a) states the
existence of a critical dove type qˆD(qH) such that the TS equilibrium exists if and only if
qD ∈ (qH , qˆD(qH)]. The threshold qˆD(qH) corresponds to the probability of guilt conditional
on all pivotal proﬁles σ−j where a truthful gl-report of agent j leads to conviction while an ir-
report leads to acquittal. Part b) states the corresponding result for the case where doves have
critical mass. Part c) yields the fundamental qualitative statement that the TS equilibrium
is compatible with the existence of conﬂict proﬁles. It stands in stark contrast to Coughlan's
impossibility result.
We outline the main steps of the proof of Theorem 1 in what follows. A ﬁrst observation
is that agents of the type that has critical mass never have an incentive to deviate as their
preferred action given aggregated information is always implemented. A second observation is
that under a non-unanimous voting rule, an agent of the type that does not have critical mass
is never pivotal at the voting stage, irrespective of whether he deviated at the communication
stage. Assuming hawks have critical mass, given sincere voting a dove's vote can only inﬂuence
the outcome if hawks vote for acquittal. The reciprocal argument holds for the case of doves
having critical mass. In both cases, however, all other agents will vote unanimously and thus
the agent's vote cannot be pivotal. A third observation is that a hawk never has an incentive
to misreport a g-signal as an i-signal while a dove never has an incentive to misreport an
i-signal as a g-signal. This immediately follows from Lemma 1, Equation (4.1). A deviation
of the above described type would only further worsen the implemented decision rule.
A fourth observation is that no agent has an incentive to misreport an i-signal as a diﬀerent
i-signal, or to misreport a g-signal as a diﬀerent g-signal. Here, the uncertainty eﬀect is key.
Consider a juror holding signal ir and contemplating announcing il instead, for l 6= r. The set
of signal proﬁles σ−j splits into pairs of proﬁles that are identical up to a simple permutation
of the numbers of ir- and il-signals. If both reports trigger identical actions for both these
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proﬁles, the reporting decision is irrelevant. Otherwise, a truthful ir-report will lead to an
acquittal for the proﬁle that features more ir-signals and lead to a conviction for the other
proﬁle. Deviating to an il -report overturns both outcomes. If the defendant is guilty, both
proﬁles are equally likely to occur and agent j is thus indiﬀerent between the two reports. If
the defendant is innocent, the proﬁle that is more consistent with agent j's own signal is more
likely than the other one given λ > 1. Hence agent j has an incentive to trigger acquittal
for the former proﬁle rather than the latter and thus to tell the truth. Deviations from one
g-signal to another are ruled out by a similar argument.
Given the four above observations, the only deviations that remain to be excluded involve
doves reporting an i-signal instead of a g-signal and hawks reporting a g-signal instead of an
i-signal. These deviations have a clear eﬀect on the outcomes via Equation (4.1). Here, the
multiplicity of pivotal proﬁles allows the consensus eﬀect to provide truthtelling incentives.
While hawks and doves have diverging interests for some pivotal proﬁles, their preferred out-
come coincides for others. This (partial) consensus is more pronounced the smaller qD − qH .
Accordingly, we get an upper bound for qD in Part a) and a lower bound for qH in Part b). As
for Part c), a type who is indiﬀerent between truthtelling and lying necessarily faces pivotal
proﬁles that incentivize truthtelling and pivotal proﬁles that incentivize deviating. For the
sake of concreteness, consider a dove holding a gl-signal and let hawks have critical mass. Let
σ be a signal proﬁle such that a hawk prefers conviction precisely for those signal proﬁles
that yield at least as much evidence for the defendant being guilty as σ does. Whenever
qD > β (σ), the proﬁle σ is a conﬂict proﬁle and incentivizes lying. On the other hand, As-
sumption 1 guarantees the existence of another signal proﬁle σ˜ that satisﬁes β (σ˜) > β (σ)
and β (σ˜ − σgl + σir) < β (σ). An example of such a proﬁle σ˜ is one that has the same total
number of i- and g-signals as σ but is either slightly less consistent with respect to its i-signals
or slightly more consistent with respect to its g-signals. Now, if β (σ˜) > qD > β (σ) then σ˜
incentivizes truthtelling and this incentive dominates the deviation incentive from σ if qD is
suﬃciently close to β (σ).8
We ﬁnally sketch how our results generalize to arbitrary preference types. For j ∈ {1, ..., n}
let qj be juror j's preference parameter and assume without loss of generality q1 ≤ ... ≤ qn.
Let k ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} denote the voting rule. The TS equilibrium then implements juror k's
optimal decision rule. For any juror j < k, the implemented decision rule is (weakly) dovish
as qj ≤ qk while for any juror j > k the decision rule is (weakly) hawkish as qj ≥ qk. The
insights from the two type case suggest that the TS equilibrium exists if and only if for all
j ∈ {1, ..., n} we have qj ∈ [qˆH (qk) , qˆD (qk)] with qˆH (q) , qˆD (q) deﬁned as in Theorem 1.
The problem is that a juror is now pivotal at the voting stage if exactly k− 1 other jurors
prefer conviction given the aggregate signal proﬁle.9 Consider a juror j < k holding an i-
signal. If this juror reports a g-signal instead, an irreversible conviction is triggered only if in
addition to juror k also juror k+ 1 prefers to convict based on the reported evidence. Indeed,
if only jurors 1 to k prefer conviction based on reports, juror j can veto a conviction. As
a consequence, for proﬁles σ−j where a particular g-announcement causes jurors 1 to k to
8Numerical simulations show that the parameter area that is compatible with the existence of the TS
equilibrium in our model is typically larger than in the binary model in Coughlan (2000). Moreover, the number
of conﬂict proﬁles compatible with the TS equilibrium becomes large when committees increase, contrasting
e.g. Le Quement (2013).
9This is ruled out in the two-type setup by excluding unanimous voting rules.
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favor a conviction based on reported evidence, a deviation to this announcement can only be
advantageous as juror j can implement his favored decision at the voting stage.
Given these considerations, the following result holds. The TS equilibrium exists if and
only if qj ∈
[
q (qk, qk+1) , q (qk, qk−1)
]
for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} where the noteworthy aspect is that
the bounds now depend on two preference types instead of only one. Furthermore, if jurors k
and k+1 favor the same action for each signal proﬁle we have q (qk, qk+1) = qˆH (qk). Likewise,
if jurors k and k−1 favor the same action for each signal proﬁle we have q (qk, qk−1) = qˆD (qk).
It follows that if jurors k − 1, k, and k + 1 share the same optimal decision rule the TS
equilibrium exists if and only if qj ∈ [qˆH (qk) , qˆD (qk)] ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} . These insights provide
some guidance regarding the optimal composition of heterogeneous committees with an eye
to maximizing truthtelling incentives. In a committee too polarized for the TS equilibrium to
exist, the inclusion of moderate agents endowed with decision power through a suitably chosen
voting rule can help to overcome lying incentives. However, a single moderate agent will not
suﬃce to ensure truthtelling.
5 Conclusion
In our collective decision model with pre-vote communication, a positive probability of ex
post disagreement among agents is frequently compatible with the existence of the truthful
communication and sincere voting equilibrium. The driving forces underlying our positive
result are the consensus and uncertainty eﬀects, both of which originate in the multiplicity of
pivotal scenarios at the communication stage. The latter feature follows from the role played by
consistency given our information structure. From a conceptual perspective, the key and novel
feature of our information structure is that a given signal is interpreted diﬀerently depending
on other available information; meaning is determined in context. We ﬁnd this aspect worth
exploring within other communication games.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We write x ≡ ∑mIt=1 xt and y ≡ ∑mGt=1 yt. The statements follow immedi-
ately from p ≥ max
{
mG−1+λ
2mG−1+λ ,
mI−1+λ
2mI−1+λ
}
and
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β (σ) =
[
1 +
P (ω ∈ I)
P (ω ∈ G) ·
mG
mI
·
(
p ·mI
(1− p) · (λ+mI − 1)
)x
·
(
(1− p) · (λ+mG − 1)
p ·mG
)y
·
∑mI
r=1 λ
xr∑mG
l=1 λ
yl
]−1
.
Note that if λ = 1 then β (σ) only depends on x and y.
Proof of Theorem 1. Observations 1 to 3 from the main text are obvious. To show observation
4, suppose ﬁrst that agent j who is not of critical mass type holds a signal s = il and considers
to report m = ir with r 6= l, l, r ∈ {1, ...,mI}. Consider two candidates for σ−j , namely
σˆ = (x1, ..., xl, ..., xr, ..., xmI , y1, ..., ymG) and σˆxl←→xr = (x1, ..., xr, ..., xl, ..., xmI , y1, ..., ymG)
and assume without loss of generality that xl ≥ xr. We compare the expected utility of the
reports m = il and m = ir conditional on σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}. If both reports m = il and
m = ir trigger identical actions, the reporting decision does not matter. In particular, this is
the case if xl = xr by Equation (4.3). If the reports trigger diﬀerent actions, then xl > xr and
thus m = il will trigger acquittal for σ−j = σˆ and conviction for σ−j = σˆxl←→xr while m = ir
will trigger conviction for σ−j = σˆ and acquittal for σ−j = σˆxl←→xr , again by Equation (4.3).
Hence
Eu [m = il|σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}]− Eu [m = ir|σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}]
= −
mG∑
t=1
P (ω = gt|s = il) · P (σ−j = σˆ|ω = gt, σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}) · (1− q)
+
mG∑
t=1
P (ω = gt|s = il) · P (σ−j = σˆxl←→xr |ω = gt, σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}) · (1− q)
−
mI∑
t=1
P (ω = it|s = il) · P (σ−j = σˆxl←→xr |ω = it, σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}) · q
+
mI∑
t=1
P (ω = it|s = il) · P (σ−j = σˆ|ω = it, σ−j ∈ {σˆ, σˆxl←→xr}) · q
=
P (ω∈I)
mI
· pλ−1+mI
P (ω∈I)
mI
· p+ P (ω∈G)mG · (1− p)
· −λ
xr+1 − λxl + λxr + λxl+1
λxr + λxl
· q
> 0.
As the set of signal proﬁles possibly held by the other agents splits into pairs of the form
{σˆ, σˆxl←→xr} this shows that the proposed deviation is not proﬁtable. Deviations from one
g-signal to another are ruled out in the same way. It remains to analyze under which circum-
stances a dove holding some g-signal wants to deviate by reporting some i-signal instead (Part
a) and under which circumstances a hawk holding some i-signal wants to deviate by reporting
some g-signal (Part b).
a) + b) Assume that agent j is a dove holding signal sj = gl for some l ∈ {1, ...,mG}
and considers reporting m = ir for some r ∈ {1, ...,mI}. By Equation (4.1), for any proﬁle
σ−j ∈ Pivir,gl (qj) a truthful report m = gl will trigger conviction while reporting m = ir will
trigger acquittal. Truthful reporting hence constitutes an equilibrium iﬀ
0 ≤ Eu (mj = gl)− Eu (mj = ir)
=
∑
σ−j∈Pivir,gl (qH)
P (σ−j |sj = gl) · β (σ−j + σgl)− P (σ−j ∈ Pivir,gl (qH) |sj = gl) · qD
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which proves Part a). Part b) follows similarly.
c) Consider the case where hawks have critical mass. Let σH be a proﬁle such that
β (σH) ≥ qj and β (σ˜) < qj for all signal proﬁles σ˜ satisfying β (σ˜) < β (σH). Such a proﬁle
exists by Assumption 1. We need to show that qˆD (qH) > β (σH) in which case σH is a conﬂict
proﬁle. Suppose agent j is a dove holding a g1-signal and considers deviating by reporting
mj = i1. By Part a) it suﬃces to show that there exist σ−j ∈ Pivi1,g1 (qH) such that
β (σ−j + σi1) < β (σH) < β (σ−j + σg1) . (A.1)
After reshuing x- and y-entries, we may assume without loss of generality that σH satisﬁes
x1 ≥ ... ≥ xmI , y1 ≥ ... ≥ ymG . First, assume that y2 > 0. Then the proﬁle σ−j = σH − σg2
satisﬁes (A.1). Similarly, if x2 > 0 then proﬁle σ−j = σH − σi2 satisﬁes (A.1). So suppose
x2 = y2 = 0. If y1 = 0 then x1 = n and σH = (n, 0, ..., 0), so hawks would want to convict
irrespective of any information. If x1 = 0 then y1 = n and σH = (0, ..., 0, y1 = n, 0, ..., 0), so
hawks would want to convict only given the maximal possible evidence of guilt. Both cases
contradict Assumption 1. Finally, assume x1 6= 0 6= y1. Since n ≥ 3 we must have x1 ≥ 2 or
y1 ≥ 2. In the former case, σ−j = σH − σi1 − σg1 + σi2 satisﬁes (A.1) while in the latter case
σ−j = σH − σi1 − σg1 + σg2 does. This ﬁnishes the proof for hawks having critical mass. The
proof for the case of doves having critical mass is alike.
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